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Abstract We investigate whether Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) managers actively manip-
ulate performance measures in spite of the strict regulation under the REIT regime. We provide
empirical evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, manipulation strategies may
rely on the opportunistic use of leverage. However, manipulation does not appear to be uniform
across REIT sectors and seems to become more common as the level of competition in the underly-
ing property sector increases. We employ a set of commonly used traditional performance measures
and a recently developed manipulation-proof measure (MPPM, Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and
Welch (2007)) to evaluate the performance of 147 REITs from seven different property sectors over
the period 1991-2009. Our findings suggest that the existing REIT regulation may fail to mitigate a
substantial agency conflict and that investors can benefit from evaluating return information carefully
in order to avoid potentially manipulative funds.
Keywords Real estate · Performance evaluation · Manipulation
1 Introduction
To what extent do U.S. REIT managers manipulate risk-adjusted performance measures to enhance
evaluation outcomes? Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) argue that managerial compensation and
reputation often depend upon performance evaluation outcomes using measures such as Jensen’s
alpha (Jensen, 1967), the Sharpe (Sharpe, 1966, 1994) and information ratios or the Stutzer index
(Stutzer, 2000). A priori, REIT managers have the same incentive to manipulate performance mea-
sures as fund managers from other asset classes. However, REITs operate in a regulated environment
that may limit manipulation opportunities. For instance, a common manipulation strategy relies on
financial derivatives (Goetzmann et al, 2007). Yet, U.S. REITs are required to generate a minimum
proportion of income from real estate, reducing the scope for managers to utilise this strategy.
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Other manipulation strategies exploit informational asymmetries between managers and unin-
formed investors (Goetzmann et al, 2007). Research suggests that REITs are a transparent invest-
ment vehicle due to their strict regulation (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hardin and Hill, 2008; Smith
and Watts, 1992), limiting the emergence of many information asymmetries. However, regulation
on the corporate level may not fully address the informational deficiencies of real estate as an asset
class, such as low levels of market transparency (Georgiev, Gupta, and Kunkel, 2003) or high levels
of private information required for accurate asset pricing (Han, 2006). Downs and Gu¨ner (1999)
document that these characteristics induce significant information asymmetries in public REIT mar-
kets. Further, REIT insiders appear to exploit information asymmetries when the opportunity arises
(Damodaran and Liu, 1993). Such opportunistic managerial behaviour can create the basis for the
manipulation of REIT performance measures.
Identifying manipulation using traditional performance metrics is difficult, as these are the same
measures that may be manipulated. In order to avoid this bias, we assess manipulation in U.S. REITs
by comparing performance evaluation outcomes under a manipulation-proof measure (MPPM) de-
veloped by Goetzmann et al (2007), with evaluation outcomes under a set of traditional performance
measures, namely the Sharpe ratio, Jensen’s alpha, the information ratio and the Stutzer index. We
test for manipulation using formal hypothesis tests based on the difference between the evidence for
out- or underperformance of a REIT over a benchmark index under the traditional measures and the
MPPM.
We find evidence that, in line with findings in the traditional equities sector and in spite of the
strict regulation, risk-adjusted performance measures in the REIT sector may indeed be manipulated.
As a result, investors may be able to benefit from assessing performance information carefully in
order to avoid funds where management engages in manipulative practices.
Evidence consistent with manipulation has increased since the inclusion of REITs in broader
stock market indices. Managers may now find their performance being monitored and assessed more
closely. We provide evidence that the changes in short-term leverage appear to be correlated with per-
formance manipulation - a manipulation strategy that is not limited by the current REIT regulation.
We present results suggesting that the extent of performance manipulation is positively correlated
with the degree of competition that prevails in a property sector. In contrast to what is often implic-
itly assumed in studies of performance manipulation, managerial incentives for manipulation do not
seem to be exogenous. We present support for this hypothesis while controlling for a REIT’s posi-
tion in the growth cycle as well as analyst coverage and the quality of corporate governance. Our
evidence suggests that analyst coverage and the quality of corporate governance fail to alleviate the
agency conflicts that cause performance manipulation.
Evidence for performance manipulation in the REIT sector has significant consequences for
investors and managers. First, evidence for manipulation suggests that the REIT regulation is inef-
ficient in mitigating a substantial agency conflict. Diversified ownership requirements in the REIT
sector imply that equity-holders are less able to rely on take-overs for the replacement of incom-
petent or indeed manipulative management. Instead, their primary defense against mismanagement
is price-protection (Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans, 2007). Therefore, REIT managers who fail to con-
vince investors that they do not manipulate performance may incur higher cost of equity. Conversely,
REIT managers can actively commit to being evaluated under the manipulation-proof measure, for
instance through incorporating this evaluation in performance-based executive compensation agree-
ments. Such a commitment may support corporate governance and sharpen their competitive advan-
tage.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the research hypotheses, Section 3 presents
data and methodology. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Research hypotheses
2.1 Evidence for manipulation
Performance measures represent an important fund selection criterion for investors, have an indirect
influence on manager reputation and often directly impact remuneration (Brown et al, 1996). Real
estate fund managers are typically evaluated and remunerated based on performance (Cannon and
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Vogt, 1995) and thus, a priori, have the same incentive to exhibit superior performance as fund
managers from other asset classes. The characteristics of real estate as an asset class give rise to
significant information asymmetries in public REIT markets (Downs and Gu¨ner, 1999) that are,
on occasion, exploited by REIT insiders (Damodaran and Liu, 1993). On this basis, we expect to
find evidence for similarly opportunistic behaviour by REIT insiders in relation to performance
manipulation.
H1: U.S. REIT managers manipulate traditional performance measures.
2.2 Manipulation strategies
Manipulation in the U.S. REIT industry requires that managers have at least one viable manipu-
lation strategy at their disposal. Goetzmann et al (2007) distinguish between static and dynamic
manipulation, each relying on different strategies. Static manipulation targets the distribution func-
tion governing the returns that feed into performance measures. Specifically, static manipulation
violates the assumption of normally distributed returns that underlies many traditional performance
measures, such as the Sharpe ratio, the information ratio, and Jensen’s alpha. Lhabitant (2000) and
Spurgin (2001) show how managers can employ derivatives strategies characterised by asymmet-
ric payoffs to enhance traditional performance measures that fail to recognise the effects of skewed
distributions.
Research into the use of derivatives in REITs is sparse, with the notable exception of Horng
and Wei (1999). Their results suggest that derivatives play a minor role in the REIT sector. First,
the authors argue that the income requirement of the REIT legislation significantly limits the use of
derivatives for speculative purposes. Consistently, their results suggest that investments in deriva-
tives by REITs mostly involve interest rate instruments to hedge financing costs and asset value
fluctuations, not investments for speculative purposes. It seems therefore unlikely that U.S. REIT
managers employ derivatives-based strategies of performance manipulation.
Dynamic manipulation of performance measures involves varying portfolio holdings depend-
ing on past performance, defying the assumption of independent and identically distributed returns
that underlies many traditional measures (Goetzmann et al, 2007). The authors show that given any
performance history within the evaluation period, the overall performance measure is maximised
by holding in the future a portfolio that maximises the performance measure calculated over the
remainder of the evaluation period. This strategy relies on increasing market exposure through the
opportunistic use of leverage.
The U.S. REIT regime does not restrict the amount of leverage employed by REITs, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly (Lehman and Roth, 2010). While the REIT regime implicitly places significant
restrictions on the use of derivatives, the lack of regulatory control over leverage choices provides
REIT managers with the scope to use leverage for performance enhancement. The opportunistic use
of leverage in order to manipulate performance evaluations resonates with aspects of REIT behaviour
previously established in empirical research. Alcock, Steiner, and Tan (2012) identify an opportunis-
tic pattern in REIT financing choices. In contrast to traditional real estate companies, REITs appear
to employ leverage to actively secure cheaper funds as well as to signal firm quality. The REIT regu-
lation appears to free up scope in the capital structure to pursue such more opportunistic objectives.
The interpretation of REIT financing behaviour as opportunistic lends support to the view that REIT
managers may employ leverage in order to enhance performance measures also.
H2: U.S. REIT managers manipulate traditional performance measures through the opportunis-
tic use of leverage.
2.3 Manipulation and competition
Arguably, REIT property sectors can be characterised by varying degrees of competition, depending
on the number of funds active in a sector. We hypothesise that higher levels of competition may
increase a fund manager’s propensity to exhibit superior performance through manipulation. The
incentives for manipulation may not be exogenous, but a function of the competitive pressure in a
property sector.
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Research traditionally suggests an inverse relationship between competition and agency con-
flicts. Hart (1983) argues that if investors cannot observe managerial effort, potential for moral
hazard may exist. For instance, managers may attribute underperformance to factors beyond their
control, such as input prices.
Hart (1983) postulates further that competition helps align managerial incentives because in-
vestors can observe a group of similar, competing firms in order to benchmark managerial effort.
However, this model relies on the investor’s ability to observe information that is relevant for bench-
marking managerial effort from a group of comparable competitors. This may not be possible for
investors trying to monitor real estate fund managers. Real estate assets are heterogenous and thus
substantially less comparable (Georgiev et al, 2003), limiting the observability of the information
that is relevant for the meaningful monitoring of managers.
Our hypothesis implies that there is more potential for genuine outperformance in a sector with
fewer competitors. Research often suggests otherwise and postulates a positive relationship between
competition and firm efficiency (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958). In this context, efficiency generally
relates to the management of production inputs relative to the value created. However, successful
real estate investment may be more closely related to the ability to obtain price-sensitive private
information about assets in a market characterised by low transparency and heterogenous assets.
While the input-output relationship determining the efficiency of industrial firms can be regarded as
a continuum, there is arguably only a fixed amount of price-sensitive information available about a
real estate asset.
If, consistent with theory, firms become more efficient with fiercer competition, they become
better at obtaining this information, and the ability of an individual firm to be the only competitor
in possession of a significant amount of private information diminishes. Therefore, the sources for
genuine outperformance in terms of superior insight or forecasting skills become increasingly thinly
spread as competition edges up. At the same time, the pressure on fund managers to compete for
sector-specific investor capital intensifies with competition, increasing the temptation for managers
to improve performance through manipulation. Differences in observed manipulation across sectors
may suggest that the incentive for manipulation is not exogenous but determined by the competitive
pressure prevailing in a sector. Specifically, we expect a positive relationship between manipulation
and competition. Two testable hypotheses result from this discussion.
H3: The evidence for manipulation is not uniform across U.S. REIT property type sectors.
H4: The extent of manipulation employed by a U.S. REIT manager is a positive function of the
level of competition in the REIT property sector.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Return and benchmark data
We analyse the monthly total return data of all U.S. publicly traded REITs contained in the SNL
database over the period December 1990 to December 2009. The final sample after exclusion of
funds with no data consists of 147 REITs and a total of 21,955 firm-month observations, covering
23 diversified, 15 hotel, 7 industrial, 20 office, 27 other (healthcare, self storage and specialty), 20
residential and 35 retail REITs. Data on sector classification is provided by SNL Financial and is
based on the percentage of total assets invested in a particular sector. We employ the S&P 500 index
as the proxy for the market benchmark, obtained from Datastream, and the 1-month treasury bill
as proxy for the risk-free rate, obtained from Kenneth French’s website, consistent with Dimson,
Marsh, and Staunton (2002).
Roll (1977, 1978) argues that the choice of market proxy matters for performance evaluation. For
robustness, we replicate our analysis on the basis of the MSCI world stock market index. Data on the
MSCI is obtained from Datastream. Dimson et al (2002) note that typically two types of proxies
for the risk-free rate are available, short-term treasury bills or government bonds with maturities from
ten to thirty years. Among the two, the short-term rate is a closer proxy for a truly risk-free asset.
However, a long-term proxy may be appropriate if the cash flows of the project extend many years
into the future, as is usually the case in real estate. In order to further test our results for robustness,
we also employ data on the 10-year U.S. government bond obtained from Datastream.
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3.2 Methodology
Hypothesis 1: Evidence for manipulation
In order to examine the empirical evidence for manipulation in the U.S. REIT industry, we assess the
consistence of out- or underperformance of REITs relative to the market benchmark. Consistence re-
lates to the evaluation outcomes achieved under the different risk-adjusted performance measures. If
REITs statistically significantly outperform the market benchmark under the traditional performance
measures as well as the MPPM, we interpret this as evidence for no manipulation. Conversely, if the
evaluation outcomes are inconsistent, in other words if REITs outperform under the traditional mea-
sures but underperform under the MPPM, we conclude that REIT managers manipulate traditional
performance measures.
For each performance measure, we test the null hypothesis that the median performance evalua-
tion outcome across all REITs is equal to the performance evaluation outcome of the market bench-
mark against the alternative hypothesis of inequality. We employ non-parametric binomial sign tests
(Friedman, 1937; Wilcoxon, 1945) to accommodate for potential non-normality and asymmetry of
the sample performance measures. However, this test has lower power than the parametric coun-
terparts (Siegel, 1956). Any rejection of the Null hypothesis is therefore conservative; it is more
difficult to find evidence for significant outperformance of REITs over the market proxy. At the
same time, it is just as difficult to prove significant underperformance under the MPPM, which is
the prerequisite for establishing evidence of manipulation in REITs. Any evidence for divergence
between performance evaluations under the traditional measures and the MPPM is therefore also
conservative.
We calculate all performance measures based on return data, rather than relying on performance
measures reported by the funds, in order to mitigate any potential selection bias induced by funds
that choose to report only certain performance measures. For each REIT we calculate Jensen’s alpha
(Jensen, 1967), the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966, 1994), the information ratio, and the Stutzer index
(Stutzer, 2000). We include the information ratio, similar in concept and form to the Sharpe ratio,
since it offers an alternative perspective on the value added through active management. However,
just like the Sharpe ratio and the Jensen measure, the information ratio implicitly relies on the as-
sumption of normally distributed returns as it uses a symmetric risk measure. The Stutzer index is
robust to non-normal return data. The underlying definition of risk as the likelihood of underper-
forming a benchmark does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the return data.
We include the Jensen measure in our analysis as it is one of the most widely used performance
measures in practice (Goetzmann et al, 2007). This measure is characterised by strong conceptual
links to the CAPM. However, some authors question the appropriateness of the single-index CAPM
in explaining REIT performance and adopt a multi-factor approach, as discussed for instance in
Clayton and MacKinnon (2003). In the context of our study, REIT managers may misrepresent fund
performance relative to a certain, commonly employed market benchmark. Manipulation-induced
outperformance might then be reduced or not apparent at all when evaluating funds against alterna-
tive benchmarks. Therefore, we also estimate an alternative alpha from a four-factor model including
the size, value and momentum effects (Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 1992).
We compare performance evaluation outcomes from the traditional measures with those from the
MPPM. Goetzmann et al (2007) define the MPPM as the certainty equivalent of the average excess
return of a risky portfolio over the risk-free rate. In order to be insensitive to static manipulation,
the MPPM is a concave function of returns. In order to be insensitive to dynamic manipulation,
the MPPM is time separable and has a strong independence property. This property originates from
utility theory and makes the MPPM insensitive to returns that are not independently and identically













where ρ represents the chosen parameter of constant relative risk aversion. Consider the following
numerical example (Goetzmann et al, 2007): A fund generates monthly returns of -10%, 5%, 17&
and -2%. For ρ = 2, the MPPM equals 6.6%. This measure represents a certainty equivalent. There-
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fore, a risk-free asset would have to earn a constant monthly rate of return of c. 1.6% to achieve the
same MPPM and make investors indifferent between the two options.
The intuition behind ρ is to link the average excess return in the MPPM to a notion of risk. As an
increasing function of returns, the MPPM is similar in concept to traditional performance measures.
For instance, the Sharpe ratio relates the average excess return to a notion of risk or the ‘price’ of the
excess return, represented by the variability of the excess return. The MPPM also relates the average
excess return to a notion of risk, by expressing this excess return as a certainty equivalent, assuming
constant relative risk aversion measured by the parameter ρ. Alternatively, the parameter ρ can be
viewed as a link of the MPPM to a benchmark portfolio earning a log-normal return r˜b. The value
of ρ is selected in line with the fundamental valuation relationship in the mean-variance framework
(Bailey, 2005):
ρ =
ln[E(1 + r˜b)] − ln[1 + rf ]
σ2[ln(1 + r˜b)]
(2)
Goetzmann et al (2007) observe historical values of ρ for common market proxy portfolios be-
tween 2 and 4, and choose a value of 3. The Morningstar Risk-Adjusted Return Measure, similar in
concept and structure to the MPPM, adopts a value of 2 (Morningstar, 2002). Given this uncertainty
surrounding the correct parametrisation, we employ ρ values of 2, 3 and 4.
We initially conduct our analysis for the full study period that covers a variety of market condi-
tions, implicitly assuming that our results do not suffer from period bias. However, the study period
covers several important events in the REIT history. As a result, we also consider a number of
sub-periods. We evaluate fund performance over the periods prior to and following the inclusion of
REITs in broad stock market indices in 2001, the periods prior to and following the onset of the
recent global financial crisis in 2008, as well as the period between these potential structural breaks,
i.e. 2002 to 2008. For robustness, we also evaluate performance over these sub-periods using the al-
ternative proxies for the the risk-free rate (10-year U.S. government bond instead of 1-month T-bill)
and the market (MSCI instead of S&P 500). The corresponding results are included in Appendix A
and B, respectively.
Hypothesis 2: Manipulation through the opportunistic use of leverage
We run the following panel regression for each performance measure:
∆PMnit = α+ β1∆LLT 12 + β2∆LLT 23 + β3∆LLT 34+
+ β4∆LST 12 + β5∆LLT 23 + β6∆LST 34 + γ
′OCVit + ǫit (3)
where ∆PMnit is the annual change in the measure n observed for fund i at the end of year t, α is
a constant, and β1 to β3 as well as β4 to β6 are the coefficients associated with quarterly changes
in long- and short-term leverage. Long-term leverage (LLT) is measured as the ratio of long-term
debt over the book value of assets, and short-term leverage (LST) is the ratio of debt with maturities
less than one year over the book value of assets. LLT12 and LST 12 for instance relate to the
change in long-term and short-term leverage from the first to the second quarter of year t. The
matrix OCVit summarises the control variables included in the analysis. We control for the annual
changes in the other performance measures observed for fund i to capture a variety of aspects of
performance. We also control for the effects of merger and acquisition activity on the performance
and financial structure of a firm by forming an indicator variable M&A that takes the value one if a
firm was part of a merger or acquisition in a given year as well as a set of corresponding interaction
terms with the leverage variables. Data about M&A activity including the identity of the buyer firm
and the target firm as well as the date of completion of the transaction is obtained from SNL.
The vector γ contains the parameters associated with the control variables. The ǫit are i.i.d. normal
residuals. We use heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust clustered standard errors (Hoechle,
2007; Petersen, 2009), and employ Hausman tests to choose between fixed or random panel effects.
Goetzmann et al (2007) argue that many traditional performance measures can be gamed via
leverage. We therefore expect that changes in quarterly leverage throughout the year are positively
related to performance evaluation outcomes over the entire year under these traditional measures.
Conversely, we expect leverage to be negatively related to the corresponding variation in the MPPM.
The MPPM should identify leverage as a source of performance that does not directly translate into
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investor utility and penalise its misuse accordingly. However, our study design assumes that the
evaluation period observed by a manager is based on calendar years, and that all manipulative ad-
justments to leverage are captured in the quarterly reports. Any evidence in favour of our hypothesis
is therefore likely to underestimate the strength of the true relationships.
Hypothesis 3: Uniformity of manipulation across REIT property sectors
In order to examine the uniformity of potential manipulation across REIT property sectors, perfor-
mance measures for individual REITs are grouped according to sector focus. The analysis of the
third hypothesis follows the methodology we employ to investigate the first hypothesis. We test
whether the median performance evaluation outcome across the REITs in a given property sector
is statistically significantly different from the corresponding market benchmark value. We employ
non-parametric binomial sign tests. A non-parametric method is especially warranted here given the
small sample size in some of the sectors.
Hypothesis 4: Manipulation as a function of competition
In order to test our last hypothesis, we first rank funds by their annual performance evaluation out-
comes under the Jensen measure and the MPPM, and obtain the annual differences in ranks as a
proxy for the degree of manipulation a fund employs.1 We then run a panel regression:
∆RANKit = α+ β1WOBS + β2AGE + β3NAN + β4GIN + β5RJEN
+ β6JEN + β7MPPM + ǫit (4)
where α is a constant, and ∆RANKit is the difference in ranks for fund i in year t. If a fund manip-
ulates the Jensen measure, it will rank higher under that measure than under the MPPM. Assuming
the MPPM is effective, the magnitude of the difference in ranks under the two measures will reflect
the extent of manipulation.
The main variable of interest, WOBS, proxies for the level of competition in a sector, measured
by the weighted number of funds active in a sector in year t. We weight the number of funds by
their share of the total number of observations in a sector in year t. This adjustment allows us
to control for cases when, in year t, a sector comprises of two funds, one of which has very few
observations compared to the competitor. We expect a positive sign on WOBS. We implicitly argue
that a sector with fewer participants has lower competition. However, an alternative interpretation
is that a smaller number of participants is a sign of lower supply of sector-specfic assets, thereby
intensifying the sector-level competition. This possibility implies that evidence to reject the null in
favour of a positive relationship between our measure of competition and the extent of manipulation
is conservative.
We include the following control variables. AGE is the cumulative number of monthly return
observations up to time t as a proxy for a fund’s age, since a fund’s position in the growth cycle may
impact on its propensity to manipulate. NAN is the average annual number of analyst forecasts for
a REIT obtained from the I/B/E/S database, on the basis that coverage can improve transparency
(Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2003; Devos, Ong, and Spieler, 2007; Downs and Gu¨ner, 1999). GIN is a
control variable capturing corporate governance using the G-Index (Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok, 2010;
Campbell, Ghosh, Petrova, and Sirmans, 2011; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), obtained from
Riskmetrics, as the quality of corporate oversight has the potential to restrict a fund manager’s
scope for manipulation. We further control for aspects of annual absolute (the value of a fund’s
Jensen and MPPM measures, JEN andMPPM ) and relative performance (a fund’s rank under the
the Jensen measure,RJEN ). Standard errors are clustered by firm to be robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
1 Note that we run these regressions for the difference in ranking under the Jensen measure and the MPPM only as this
difference produces the highest cross-sectional variation, a strategy commonly employed in the literature (Daniel and Titman,
2011; Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Fama and MacBeth, 1973).
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3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the monthly total returns for the different REIT sectors,
REITs overall and the benchmarks over the full study period. The REIT sample consists of 21,955
firm-month observations. REITs overall have a mean monthly total return of 1.20%, as compared to
0.80% for the S&P 500. Simple χ2 tests detect that REITs on average exhibit significantly higher
variation in monthly total returns (11.13%) than the S&P 500 (4.29%). Simple t-tests (for unequal
variances) suggest that on average, REIT returns seem in line with the market.
Retail and office REITs have the highest average total return (1.37% and 1.31% respectively)
while hotel REITs have the lowest return (0.71%). Conversely, hotel REITs exhibit the highest stan-
dard deviation of returns (14.31%) as compared to retail and office REITs (12.66% and 11.16%
respectively). Diversified REITs exhibit the lowest levels of standard deviation (9.08%), at below
average return levels (1.07%). The contrast between the sectors suggests a link between REIT per-
formance and the nature of the underlying operation as suggested in Mueller and Anikeeff (2001).
The values of skewness and kurtosis suggest non-normal return distributions. Given the limitations
of many traditional performance measures in relation to the underlying probability distribution of
returns (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch, 2004), this finding reinforces the importance of
including a performance measure in our analysis that accounts for non-normality, such as the Stutzer
index. On average, REITs have a CAPM β of 0.8686, consistent with anecdotal evidence that real
estate securities display lower sensitivity to market returns than the average financial asset. Among
the specialised REIT sectors, discarding the combined category of other REITs, retail, office and
residential REITs are the largest sectors by the number of funds and observations, suggesting higher
levels of competition.
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the distribution of firm-month observations in our sample. The
median number of firm-month observations is 180 with a standard deviation of 65. Under 15% of the
firms have five years or less of consecutive firm-month observations for total returns. Approximately
25% of the firms in the sample have return data for the entire study period. The majority of REITs
in the sample have broadly between 60 and 220 firm-month observations for total return data.
Performance measures can be utilised to establish relative fund rankings (Chen and Knez, 1996;
Eling, 2008; Eling and Schuhmacher, 2007; Sharpe, 1966). Brown, Kang, In, and Lee (2010) use
ranking correlations to test the ability of the MPPM to detect manipulation and confirm that the
MPPM evaluates performance more accurately than other measures. The intuition behind this ap-
proach is as follows. Consider total fund performance as the sum of the performance generated
through skill and potentially another component that stems from manipulation. The MPPM is de-
signed to strip out the manipulation element and assess performance solely based on the genuine
element. In the absence (presence) of manipulation, the traditional measures and the MPPM pro-
duce the same (different) relative fund rankings, and the ranking correlation between traditional
performance measures and the MPPM should be high (low) (Brown et al, 2010).
The ranking correlations between the performance measures for individual REITs are shown in
Table 2 and illustrated in Figures 2 and 2. The lowest correlations are observed between the Jensen
measure and the MPPM, suggesting that the Jensen measure may be subject to manipulation. In
relative terms, the differences in ranks for individual funds will be greatest when comparing the
Jensen ranking with the MPPM ranking, especially for performance measures calculated using the
10-year government bond. On the other hand, the ranking correlation between the Stutzer index and
the MPPM is high, suggesting that the Stutzer index may not be gamed. However, if fund managers
perform equally well based on skill, the correlation between traditional performance measures and
the MPPM should be determined by the differences in manipulation only. If fund managers manip-
ulate to similar extents, ranking correlations may not be able to unveil manipulation. This is why we
employ explicit hypothesis tests to establish statistically robust evidence of manipulation.
4 Results
4.1 Evidence for manipulation in the REIT sector
Table 3 shows the performance evaluation results of U.S. REITs over the full study period. When
considering the 1-month T-bill and the S&P 500 as benchmark proxies, REITs show a significantly
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positive Jensen’s alpha, suggesting positive value added for investors through active REIT manage-
ment. The information ratio also suggests outperformance. When we evaluate REIT performance
on the basis of the alternative alpha determined in a broader four-factor model, the evidence for
outperformance remains significant, but as expected the magnitude of outperformance is reduced
in comparison to the original Jensen’s alpha. We interpret this finding as evidence suggesting that
REIT managers may focus on delivering superior performance relative to the single-index market
benchmark.
However, these traditional performance measures may, at least partially, be influenced by manip-
ulation. REITs appear to significantly underperform the market under the MPPM, and increasingly
so for higher values of ρ. The discrepancy between evaluation outcomes using the traditional mea-
sures and the MPPM is consistent with the hypothesis that REITs employ strategies of manipulation.
This result is in principle in line with studies of manipulation in the REIT sector that focus on ac-
counting measures, such as funds from operations (Graham and Knight, 2000; Zhu, 2006; Zhu, Ong,
and Yeo, 2010).
Our result implies that the REIT regulation seems inefficient in preventing a significant agency
conflict that leaves managers room to manipulate performance measures. The characteristics of real
estate as an asset class appear to generate sufficient private information that can be exploited by
REIT managers to misrepresent performance evaluation outcomes. Our findings imply that investors
need to evaluate fund return data carefully to identify funds where management may engage in ma-
nipulative practices to misrepresent fund performance. Investors may be able to improve their basis
for making investment decisions by evaluating funds under the MPPM. This performance measure
appears to be able to add substantial information about fund performance beyond that contained in
many other common performance measures.
Panel (b) of Table 3 shows the results of our performance evaluation using the 10-year govern-
ment bond as the alternative proxy for the risk-free rate. The resulting findings appear to be largely
robust to using this alternative proxy. However, we now find additional evidence consistent with
manipulation of the Sharpe ratio and the Stutzer index that is not apparent when using the 1-month
T-bill. This new finding suggests that the short-term interest rate may be of significance in manipu-
lation strategies, a result to which we return when examining the relationship between manipulation
and the use of leverage. Panels (c) and (d) of Table 3 show the performance evaluation results for the
MSCI world index as the alternative market proxy. The evidence we present consistent with manip-
ulation is largely equivalent to the original evidence using the S&P 500, suggesting that our findings
are robust to the choice of market proxy.
In the period prior to the inclusion of REITs in the broader stock market indices in 2001, the
evidence we find consistent with manipulation is closely aligned with the evidence for the full study
period (Panel (a) of Table 4). From 2002 onwards, the magnitude of out- and underperformance
of REITs relative to the market proxy under the traditional measures and the MPPM (especially
for ρ equals 3 and 4) seems more pronounced (Panel (b)). The extent of potential manipulation
may have increased as REITs are evaluated in more direct comparison to the general stock market.
Evidence consistent with manipulation appears to be stronger in the period after the onset of the
global financial crisis from 2008 onwards as compared to the period before 2008 (Panels (c) and (d)).
Lastly, evidence consistent with manipulation seems slightly weaker in the intermediate period 2002-
2008 (Panel (e)). Anecdotal evidence suggests that these were unusually strong years for REITs, so
that outperformance in this period seems genuine.
4.2 Manipulation through the use of leverage
Table 5 shows the results from the panel regressions of annual changes in fund performance measures
on quarterly changes in leverage and the control variables. Changes in short-term leverage from the
second to the third quarter appear to be positively related to the change in that fund’s information
ratio over the entire year. Our evidence seems consistent with REIT managers engaging in dynamic
manipulation of the information ratio. A fund manager may monitor fund performance from the
start of the evaluation period at the beginning of year t until a point when she judges that the fund
has shown poor performance to date, say, the end of the second quarter of year t. Our findings
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are consistent with the manager adjusting short-term leverage in the third quarter, improving the
evaluation outcome for the year.
Short-term debt is priced at a rate more closely aligned with the short-term T-bills, reflecting
our comment on the significance of the short-term interest in manipulation strategies. In Table 6 we
replicate the leverage analysis using performance measures that are calculated on the basis of excess
returns over the 10-year government bond. In this case, the Sharpe ratio also responds positively to
changes in short-term leverage, supporting the evidence consistent with a link between manipulation
and the use of leverage. This finding reflects that it may become more difficult to identify manip-
ulation strategies if these involve the use of interest rates closely aligned with those employed to
calculate the performance measures to be analysed.
Our result further suggests that improvements in performance evaluation outcomes are primar-
ily related to change sin short-term leverage. This finding seems intuitive. Managers who seek to
manipulate performance may be more willing to temporarily accept sub-optimal levels of short-term
debt as these positions are naturally reversed more quickly and economically than debt holdings with
longer maturities.
We find that evaluation outcomes under the MPPM are negatively related to changes in long-term
leverage from the second to the third quarter of the year. This finding is in line with expectations
that the MPPM, unlike the traditional measures, controls for the effect of leverage as a source of
performance that does not directly translate into investor utility. The negative sign of the coefficient
is consistent with the MPPM correctly identifying manipulation strategies based on leverage and
penalising the funds concerned by assigning a lower evaluation value. As intuition would suggest,
the magnitude of the effect increases with the risk aversion parameter ρ.
Our findings may also provide some insight into REIT capital structure choices. The absence
of corporate taxation and the strict income distribution rules in the REIT sector call into question
the applicability of many common corporate leverage theories. Howe and Shilling (1988) assert that
in the absence of tax benefits, REITs cannot compete for debt and will favour equity. Similarly,
Shilling (1994) argues that REIT value is maximised for equity-only financing. It has long puz-
zled researchers why REITs still use debt, and in some cases substantially higher leverage ratios
than unregulated real estate companies. The consideration of endogeneity and simultaneity between
leverage and maturity choices (Alcock et al, 2012) provides more detailed insight into the ques-
tion and helps identify an opportunistic pattern in REIT financing decisions. Their findings suggest
that the regulatory setting and tax-exempt status of REITs provides sufficient flexibility in the capi-
tal structure to exploit the benefits of more offensive capital structure strategies. Our findings from
the present study suggest that, in line with this opportunistic approach to financing choices, REITs
might employ leverage in order to deliberately enhance performance and modify the established,
income-orientied characteristics of REIT investments.
Not all traditional performance measures show positive relationships with changes in leverage.
This finding is in principle consistent with fund managers concentrating manipulation efforts on the
most common performance measures that arguably have the strongest impact on remuneration and
reputation. Similarly, performance evaluation outcomes are not significantly related to changes in
leverage over all quarters of the year. This finding may suggest that fund managers wait until suffi-
cient evidence for unsatisfactory performance has accumulated before adjusting leverage to enhance
performance evaluation outcomes. Alternatively, the cost of adjusting leverage to remedy under-
performance may on occasion be too high. Lastly, the selective nature of manipulative adjustments
to capital structure may reflect that certain periods of the year are more relevant for performance
evaluation than others.
Table 5 shows that the Sharpe and Jensen measures also appear to be negatively related to
changes in leverage in some quarters of the year. Assume a fund’s performance is evaluated over
the twelve months to June each year. Also assume that a fund manager has taken on a sub-optimal
level of leverage throughout the second half of the evaluation period after observing poor fund per-
formance during the first half. If the fund performance is evaluated at the end of June, the sub-optimal
leverage position is likely to be corrected in the third quarter of the year, when the excess leverage
is no longer required to enhance performance.
Our implicit assumption about the timing of evaluation and reporting practice may lead us to
observe an apparent inverse relationship between annual changes in fund performance and quarterly
changes in leverage. This assumption also implies that any evidence we find for significant relation-
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ships between annual fund performance and quarterly leverage possibly understates the true strength
of the relationship.
4.3 Uniformity of manipulation across REIT property type sectors
Table 7 reports the results of the hypothesis tests for out- or underperformance of REIT sectors rela-
tive to the market. Most sectors seem to outperform under the Jensen measure. Hotel and industrial
REITs perform in line with the market. The relative homogeneity of evaluation results under the
Jensen measure is in line with Goetzmann et al (2007) who argue that outperformance is easier to
achieve under the Jensen measure since the null hypothesis is that alpha is equal to zero. However,
under the Sharpe ratio a fund must first make up the difference between zero excess return and the
excess return of the market. However, the homogeneity in the Jensen-based assessment appears to
contradict our earlier argument that the degree of manipulation of the Jensen measure differs signif-
icantly across funds. However, here we aim to relate differences in evaluation outcomes to property
sectors. Discrepancies in evaluation outcomes across funds can arise for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing property sector focus, but also manager skill. The evidence for a lack of outperformance in the
industrial sector is inconsistent with the Mueller and Anikeeff evidence. However, they focus their
analysis on the coefficient of variation, a measure of risk-adjusted performance we do not consider
in this study.
Under the Sharpe ratio, most sectors perform in line with the market, while hotel REITs signif-
icantly underperform. The evidence for a lack of outperformance in hotel REITs under the Jensen
and Sharpe measures is consistent with previous evidence (Kim, Gu, and Mattila, 2002). Mueller
and Anikeeff (2001) argue that hotel leases have the strongest link to the underlying business, and
therefore both income and long-term returns have higher volatility, detracting from risk-adjusted
performance. As compared to the Jensen measure, the magnitude of out performance of REIT sec-
tors over the market benchmark is significantly reduced, consistent with the view that performance
is managed relative to a particularly popular benchmark model. Managerial efforts, especially if ap-
parent strong performance is actually induced by manipulation, do not seem to pertain to the same
degree in the less common four-factor benchmark model.
The results of the information ratio and the Stutzer index are consistent with the Jensen and
Sharpe measures, respectively. The similarity between the evaluation results under the Information
ratio and the Jensen measure reflects the similarity in their evaluation objectives. Jensen’s Alpha
measures the excess return earned that is not due to a fund’s sensitivity to variations in the return on
the market benchmark, and is therefore a measure of active management. The form of the Informa-
tion ratio is more alike to the Sharpe ratio, but its objective is the evaluation of a fund’s active return:
the excess return earned by deliberately tilting the fund portfolio away from the benchmark relative
to the variability of that excess return.
The similarity between the evaluation results under the Sharpe ratio and the Stutzer index is
somewhat surprising but may reflect that the Stutzer index mainly aims to account for observed
investor skewness preference. However, the values of kurtosis in our sample diverge more heavily
from those implied in the normal distribution than the values of skewness. The Stutzer index aims to
produce a relative ranking of funds with non-normal returns without penalising positive skewness. If
non-normality is relatively more due to excess kurtosis rather than excess skewness, the differences
in evaluation results produced under the Stutzer index and the Sharpe ratio may be less apparent.
Under the MPPM, diversified, industrial, other and residential REITs do not outperform the mar-
ket. Hotel, office and retail REITs significantly underperform. The hotel REIT result is consistent
with the evaluation under the traditional measures. However, our results suggest performance ma-
nipulation in office and retail REITs. These sectors appear to perform as strongly as the market
benchmark under the traditional measures but underperform under the MPPM. Residential REITs
outperform under some of the traditional measures but fail to do so under all variants of the MPPM.
Overall, our results suggest that, consistent with our hypothesis, not all REIT sectors show evi-
dence of performance manipulation. There appear to be significant differences in the extent to which
manipulative practices are employed to in the different REIT property sectors to enhance perfor-
mance evaluation outcomes.
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4.4 Manipulation and competition
Table 8 shows the results from a regression of the difference in ranking under the Jensen measure
relative to the ranking under the MPPM on the number of funds in a sector, weighted by their share
of the total number of observations in the sector and a set of control variables. As we hypothesise,
the weighted number of funds in a sector is significantly related to the difference in ranking of a
fund under the Jensen measure and the MPPM. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient
also carries a positive sign. The higher the weighted number of funds in a sector, i.e. the higher
the competition, the greater the difference in ranking for a fund under the Jensen measure and the
MPPM.
The greater the competition in a sector, the more the average non-manipulative fund will improve
in the ranking under the MPPM from where it was ranked under the Jensen measure. Assume that
not all funds manipulate performance, at least not to the same degree. Then the average fund will
improve in the ranking under the MPPM. Under the Jensen measure, the average fund was outranked
by those competitors that successfully manipulate performance. Under the MPPM, those funds that
previously ranked higher are identified as manipulative, and are penalised relative to the average
fund.
Our findings are robust to controlling for fund age and the strength of corporate governance. The
lack of association between the G-index and manipulation is consistent with the evidence presented
in Bauer et al (2010) that there is no significant link between the strength of corporate governance
in REITs and REIT value or performance. Consider the effect of corporate governance as ensuring
that fund performance actually creates value for investors. Our dependent variable is the difference
in ranking of a fund under the Jensen measure and the MPPM, which can be interpreted as the differ-
ence between performance and actual value added for investors. If there is no significant relationship
between corporate governance and REIT performance, this means that corporate governance cannot
explain the differential between performance and value for investors either.
The insignificance of analyst coverage in our regression is consistent with Downs and Gu¨ner
(1999) who present evidence that the informational deficiencies of real estate as the underlying asset
class induce significant information asymmetries in the public REIT markets that are not mitigated
or alleviated by analyst following.
5 Conclusion
Risk-adjusted performance measures represent important fund selection criteria for investors. How-
ever, the possibility for manipulation of traditional performance measures detracts from their reli-
ability. Investors may be led to trust that the strict REIT regulation prevents the agency conflicts
underlying the manipulation of performance measures. In this study, we present some empirical ev-
idence to the contrary. Our evidence seems to suggest that REIT managers may in fact be able to
manipulate some widely used performance measures. At the same time, we do not attempt to provide
a fully exhaustive explanation of every difference between evaluation outcomes established using
traditional performance and the MPPM, and acknowledge that there may be other reasons for diver-
gence apart from manipulation. Examples could include the commonly reported serial correlation of
direct real estate return distributions, which may affect some traditional performance measures.
We provide empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that REIT managers may op-
portunistically employ leverage in order to game performance measures. Our results suggest that
the agency conflicts underlying performance manipulation cannot be fully mitigated by the REIT
regulation so long as leverage is not strictly controlled. Of course, the manipulation of traditional
risk-adjusted performance measures is difficult to detect. Our evidence suggests that investors can
gain important information by analysing REIT returns carefully using the MPPM measure.
We find that the extent of manipulation appears to be positively related to the level of competi-
tion in a property sector. Our results support the view that incentives for performance manipulation
are not exogenous but a function of the prevailing competitive pressures. As a result, investors are
able to utilise information about sector competition to assess the likelihood of a fund engaging in
manipulative practices. Investors can then selectively monitor those funds that seem at risk of ma-
nipulating performance measures in an efficient and targeted manner. We further provide evidence
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that investors cannot rely on analyst following or corporate governance to discipline managers and
suppress the manipulation of performance evaluations.
Given increased investor need for price-protection in the REIT industry against the backdrop of
diversified ownership requirements, REITs that manipulate performance may incur higher cost of
equity. However, managers can commit to evaluations under the MPPM, e.g. via executive compen-
sation, and thus improve corporate governance.
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Fig. 1 The graph shows a histogram of the firms in the final sample. The horizontal axis shows the number of firm-month observations in the
final sample comprising 147 REITs over the period 1991 to 2009, and a total of 21,955 firm-month observations. The vertical axis shows the
percentage of a certain firm-month observation range of the total sample in steps of 12 months.
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Comparison of 95% confidence intervals of correlation coefficients between REIT rankings under various performance measures -
using 1-month T-bill






















Fig. 2 The table shows the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated correlation coefficients between the individual REIT rankings under
various performance measures. We use the Fisher transformation to determine the confidence intervals of the correlation coefficients (Fisher,
1915, 1921).
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Comparison of 95% confidence intervals of correlation coefficients between REIT rankings under various performance measures -
using 10-year government bond






















Fig. 3 The table shows the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated correlation coefficients between the individual REIT rankings under
various performance measures. We use the Fisher transformation to determine the confidence intervals of the correlation coefficients (Fisher,
1915, 1921).
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Descriptive statistics of monthly total returns for REITs and benchmarks
Sector Mean Median Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Mean β REITs N
Diversified 0.0107 0.0083 0.0908*** 1.6944 32.4904 0.6629 23 3,456
Hotel 0.0071 0.0042 0.1431*** 2.0337 23.5842 1.5230 15 1,825
Industrial 0.0103 0.0126 0.1182*** 9.5806 233.2947 1.0086 7 1,056
Office 0.0131 0.0123 0.1116*** 1.5754 22.8580 0.8996 20 2,903
Other 0.0127 0.0132 0.0914*** 0.0695 10.9445 0.9464 27 3,470
Residential 0.0122 0.0112 0.0984*** 8.1049 239.3538 0.5779 20 3,460
Retail 0.0137 0.012 0.1266*** 5.1898 92.6411 0.7836 35 5,785
Total 0.0120 0.0111 0.1113*** 4.1624 89.6300 0.8686 147 21,955
Benchmarks
10-yr Govt. bond 0.0055 0.0056 0.0214 0.0621 4.7353 n/a n/a 228
1-mth T-bill 0.0030 0.0033 0.0015 -0.4441 2.0038 n/a n/a 228
S&P 500 0.0080 0.0128 0.0429 -0.7145 4.4270 n/a n/a 228
MSCI 0.0068 0.0122 0.0431 -0.8289 4.8934 n/a n/a 228
Table 1 The table shows descriptive statistics for monthly total returns generated from the seven different REIT sectors as well as all REITs
(denoted Total), the stock market (S&P 500 and MSCI world index) and the risk-free rate (10-year U.S. government bonds and 1-month U.S.
treasury bills) benchmarks over the full study period from December 1990 to December 2009, comprising of a total of 21,955 firm-month
observations for REITs as obtained from SNL Financial. Values for mean, median and standard deviation (Std. dev.) are in decimal form.
Simple F tests (Levene, 1960) are employed to detect statistically significant differences in standard deviations from the S&P 500. Simple
t-tests for unequal variances are employed to detect statistically significant differences in mean returns of the REIT sectors and all REITs from
the S&P 500. Mean β refers to the mean value of the CAPM β estimate across the REITs in a sector during the study period relative to the
1-month treasury bill and the S&P 500. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Pearson ranking correlation coefficients for individual REITs
Panel (a) Sharpe Jensen MPPM2 MPPM3 MPPM4 Info-Ratio Stutzer
Sharpe 1.0000
Jensen 0.7454 1.0000
MPPM2 0.8892 0.5131 1.0000
MPPM3 0.8447 0.4286 0.9873 1.0000
MPPM4 0.8062 0.3739 0.9625 0.9911 1.0000
Info-Ratio 0.8007 0.8568 0.6500 0.5867 0.5364 1.0000
Stutzer 0.9375 0.5606 0.9591 0.9482 0.9318 0.6782 1.0000
Panel (b) Sharpe Jensen MPPM2 MPPM3 MPPM4 Info-Ratio Stutzer
Sharpe 1.0000
Jensen 0.7357 1.0000
MPPM2 0.8393 0.4169 1.0000
MPPM3 0.7721 0.3181 0.9851 1.0000
MPPM4 0.7170 0.2544 0.9553 0.9895 1.0000
Info-Ratio 0.8161 0.8350 0.6489 0.5762 0.5200 1.0000
Stutzer 0.9980 0.7521 0.8291 0.7599 0.7040 0.8181 1.0000
Table 2 The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the individual REIT rankings under various performance measures.
Panel (a) uses the 1-month T-bill as proxy for the risk-free rate, Panel (b) uses the 10-year government bond for comparison.
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Performance evaluation results
Panel (a) 1MTB & S&P 500, full study period Panel (b) 10YGB & S&P 500, full study period
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.0978 0.1178 0.0016 Sharpe 0.0688 0.0517 0.0049
Jensen 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0003 0.0377 0.0001 MPPM2 -0.0289 0.0070 0.0003
MPPM3 -0.0530 0.0261 0.0000 MPPM3 -0.0857 -0.0080 0.0000
MPPM4 -0.1187 0.0142 0.0000 MPPM4 -0.1576 -0.0236 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0639 0.0000 0.0000 Info-Ratio 0.0578 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0058 -0.0068 0.0101 Stutzer -0.0030 -0.0013 0.0061
Panel (c) 1MTB & MSCI, full study period Panel (d) 10YGB & MSCI full study period
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.0978 0.0890 0.4096 Sharpe 0.0688 0.0265 0.0000
Jensen 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0003 0.0230 0.0316 MPPM2 -0.0289 -0.0436 0.4096
MPPM3 -0.0530 0.0110 0.0000 MPPM3 -0.0857 -0.0592 0.0692
MPPM4 -0.1187 -0.0013 0.0000 MPPM4 -0.1576 -0.0753 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0639 0.0000 0.0000 Info-Ratio 0.0578 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0058 -0.0039 0.2819 Stutzer -0.0030 -0.0004 0.0000
Table 3 The table shows the results of the performance evaluation of REITs overall under the chosen set of traditional and manipulation-proof
performance measures with varying degrees of constant relative risk aversion ranging from 2 to 4 (denoted MPPM2, MPPM3, and MPPM4).
The values shown are the median evaluation results for the full study period using the 10-year U.S. government bond and the 1-month U.S.
treasury bills as well as the S&P 500 and the MSCI world index as alternative proxies for the risk-free rate and the stock market benchmark. Alt.
α relates to the value of the constant in a four-factor model. Benchmark values are the values against which REITs are evaluated. For example,
for the Sharpe ratio, the benchmark is the Sharpe ratio of the stock market proxy. For the Jensen measure, the corresponding benchmark is zero,
as implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Probability is the probability of observing a particular performance measure under the Null of
equality with the benchmark value and is obtained from non-parametric binomial sign tests (Friedman, 1937; Wilcoxon, 1945).
Performance evaluation results - sub-periods
Panel (a) 1MTB & S&P 500, pre-2002 Panel (b) 1MTB & S&P 500, post-2002
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1502 0.2038 0.0000 Sharpe 0.0863 0.0113 0.0000
Jensen 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0616 0.0792 0.0004 MPPM2 -0.0192 -0.0191 1.0000
MPPM3 0.0428 0.0689 0.0000 MPPM3 -0.0729 -0.0322 0.0005
MPPM4 0.0254 0.0584 0.0000 MPPM4 -0.1576 -0.0459 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0265 0.0000 0.0504 Info-Ratio 0.0973 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0111 -0.0194 0.0000 Stutzer -0.0044 -0.0001 0.0000
Panel (c) 1MTB & S&P 500, pre-2008 Panel (d) 1MTB & S&P 500, post-2008
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1422 0.1693 0.0008 Sharpe 0.0504 -0.1151 0.0000
Jensen 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0163 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0069 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0026 0.0000 0.0131
MPPM2 0.0574 0.0601 0.5066 MPPM2 -0.1991 -0.1506 0.0131
MPPM3 0.0366 0.0509 0.0046 MPPM3 -0.3512 -0.1801 0.0000
MPPM4 0.0108 0.0414 0.0000 MPPM4 -0.5105 -0.2103 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0560 0.0000 0.0000 Info-Ratio 0.1316 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0114 -0.0125 0.0459 Stutzer -0.0015 0.0000 0.0000
Panel (e) 1MTB & S&P 500, 2002-2008
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1527 0.0956 0.0000
Jensen 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0073 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0638 0.0251 0.0000
MPPM3 0.0396 0.0179 0.0077
MPPM4 0.0161 0.0105 0.2449
Info-Ratio 0.0942 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0129 -0.0028 0.0000
Table 4 The table shows the results of the performance evaluation of all REITs (representing the simple unweighted average of all REITs)
under the chosen set of traditional and manipulation-proof performance measures with varying degrees of constant relative risk aversion ranging
from 2 to 4 (denoted MPPM2, MPPM3, and MPPM4) when considering several sub-periods demarcated by significant dates in the U.S. REIT
history using the 1-month T-bill and the S&P 500 index as proxies for the risk-free rate and the stock market benchmark. The values shown
are the median evaluation results. Alt. α relates to the value of the constant in a four-factor model. Benchmark values are the values against
which REITs are evaluated. Probability is the probability of observing a particular performance measure under the Null of equality with the
benchmark value and is obtained from non-parametric binomial sign tests (Friedman, 1937; Wilcoxon, 1945).
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Annual changes in performance measures regressed on changes in quarterly long-term and short-term fund leverage and controls -
1-month T-bill
Sharpe Jensen MPPM2 MPPM3 MPPM4 Info-Ratio Stutzer
D.Sharpe 0.022 1.310*** 1.414*** 1.538*** 0.816*** -29.090***
(0.013) (0.079) (0.101) (0.128) (0.041) (1.209)
D.Jensen 0.814 -1.554 -3.405 -5.261 4.045*** 8.162
(0.418) (2.008) (2.789) (3.491) (0.568) (12.143)
D.MPPM2 0.217*** -0.007 -0.040 4.537***
(0.031) (0.010) (0.033) (0.916)
D.Info-Ratio 0.360*** 0.049*** -0.106 -0.082 -0.071 8.225***
(0.034) (0.004) (0.093) (0.128) (0.160) (1.030)
D.Stutzer -0.020*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
LEVLT12 -0.107 -0.028 -1.289 -1.588 -1.902 0.450** -7.764
(0.189) (0.051) (0.907) (1.085) (1.266) (0.166) (4.831)
LEVLT23 -0.110 0.010 -0.645** -0.856*** -1.104*** 0.171 -0.295
(0.101) (0.016) (0.206) (0.260) (0.330) (0.163) (3.619)
LEVLT34 -0.125* 0.009 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.056 -2.654
(0.063) (0.011) (0.160) (0.207) (0.258) (0.083) (2.386)
LEVST12 0.531 -0.206 -3.800 -3.873 -3.384 0.323 4.583
(1.023) (0.165) (5.706) (6.857) (7.867) (1.053) (21.538)
LEVST23 0.666 -0.472** 0.121 -3.076 -6.277 2.455*** 26.736
(0.602) (0.161) (3.068) (3.717) (4.826) (0.552) (22.167)
LEVST34 -0.416 0.029 2.071 3.570 5.025 0.040 -15.172
(0.302) (0.043) (1.779) (3.353) (4.886) (0.220) (8.764)
M&A -0.039 0.004 0.050* 0.068** 0.087** -0.009 -1.185
(0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (1.018)
M&A*LEVLT12 -0.330 0.119 1.966 2.308 2.656 -1.247 -21.624
(0.518) (0.070) (1.050) (1.246) (1.443) (0.967) (23.273)
M&A*LEVLT23 -0.021 -0.045 0.757* 0.914* 1.109* 0.157 5.942
(0.456) (0.037) (0.375) (0.448) (0.541) (0.942) (18.463)
M&A*LEVLT34 -0.226 0.002 0.206 0.189 0.185 -0.021 -10.095
(0.469) (0.030) (0.405) (0.472) (0.557) (0.647) (16.511)
Constant 0.008** -0.001 -0.016* -0.034*** -0.052*** 0.002 0.392***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.097)
R2 0.86 0.49 0.48 0.35 0.26 0.69 0.66
N 1,449 1,449 1,449 1,449 1,449 1,449 1,449
Table 5 The table shows the results from a set of panel regressions to explore the effects of changes in quarterly long-term and short-term
leverage on the individual performance measures calculated annually over the study period. Long-term leverage (LLT) is calculated quarterly
as the ratio of long-term debt over the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is calculated quarterly as the ratio of debt with maturities less
than one year over the book value of assets. Quarterly data is obtained from Compustat. The performance measures are calculated on the basis
of excess returns over the 1-month T-bill. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm to be consistent in the presence of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle, 2007). Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** significant at 0.1%, ** at 1%, * at 5%.
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Annual changes in performance measures regressed on changes in quarterly long-term and short-term fund leverage and controls -
10-year government bond
Sharpe Jensen MPPM2 MPPM3 MPPM4 Info-Ratio Stutzer
D.Sharpe 0.012 1.139*** 1.215*** 1.307*** 0.549*** -0.279***
(0.008) (0.061) (0.074) (0.090) (0.043) (0.013)
D.Jensen 0.719 -4.044* -6.195** -8.495** 5.230*** -0.209
(0.473) (1.605) (2.295) (2.940) (0.402) (0.128)
D.MPPM2 0.247*** -0.015* 0.021 0.026***
(0.035) (0.007) (0.029) (0.007)
D.Info-Ratio 0.343*** 0.056*** 0.060 0.115 0.167 0.059***
(0.042) (0.003) (0.081) (0.117) (0.150) (0.012)
D.Stutzer -1.494*** -0.019 0.648*** 0.626*** 0.619** 0.508***
(0.072) (0.012) (0.162) (0.187) (0.218) (0.103)
LEVLT12 0.080 -0.020 -1.556 -1.854 -2.167 0.285 -0.014
(0.239) (0.045) (1.054) (1.245) (1.439) (0.160) (0.055)
LEVLT23 -0.102 -0.001 -0.710*** -0.891*** -1.103*** 0.154 -0.031
(0.108) (0.015) (0.210) (0.260) (0.325) (0.130) (0.050)
LEVLT34 -0.118 0.009 -0.025 -0.023 -0.030 0.024 -0.023
(0.077) (0.010) (0.165) (0.207) (0.254) (0.082) (0.030)
LEVST12 1.529 -0.545 -4.202 -6.173 -7.878 2.235 0.304*
(1.075) (0.382) (5.604) (6.593) (7.709) (1.882) (0.141)
LEVST23 0.607* -0.307*** -0.974 -1.241 -1.531 1.313* 0.126
(0.248) (0.092) (0.946) (1.074) (1.535) (0.517) (0.089)
LEVST34 -0.440 0.047 1.785 2.955 4.089 0.185 -0.037
(0.258) (0.039) (1.149) (2.194) (3.216) (0.270) (0.076)
M&A 0.021 0.005* 0.010 0.030 0.050 -0.059 0.018
(0.037) (0.002) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.018)
M&A*LEVLT12 -0.143 0.114 1.854 2.238 2.636 -1.680 -0.276
(0.625) (0.065) (1.093) (1.306) (1.525) (0.873) (0.369)
M&A*LEVLT23 -0.638 0.004 1.094* 1.289* 1.525* 0.055 -0.330
(0.401) (0.037) (0.452) (0.517) (0.599) (0.740) (0.279)
M&A*LEVLT34 0.006 0.003 0.101 0.131 0.178 -0.043 0.182
(0.562) (0.024) (0.513) (0.573) (0.647) (0.620) (0.345)
Constant 0.006 -0.002*** -0.015 -0.036** -0.058*** 0.012** 0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.004) (0.001)
R2 0.81 0.51 0.51 0.39 0.31 0.66 0.60
N 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484
Table 6 The table shows the results from a set of panel regressions to explore the effects of changes in quarterly long-term and short-term
leverage on the individual performance measures calculated annually over the study period. Long-term leverage (LLT) is calculated quarterly
as the ratio of long-term debt over the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is calculated quarterly as the ratio of debt with maturities
less than one year over the book value of assets. Quarterly data is obtained from Compustat. The performance measures are calculated on the
basis of excess returns over the 10-year government bond. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by firm to be consistent in the
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle, 2007). Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** significant at 0.1%, ** at
1%, * at 5%.
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Performance evaluation results - full study period, sector level
All Sharpe Jensen Alt Alpha MPPM2 MPPM3 MPPM4 Info-Ratio Stutzer
Diversified 0.1043 0.0054 0.0032 0.0235 -0.0142 -0.0810 0.0586 -0.0059
Hotel 0.0481 0.0030 0.0010 -0.1844 -0.3331 -0.5021 0.0387 -0.0019
Industrial 0.0608 0.0048 0.0065 -0.0689 -0.1346 -0.2162 0.0419 -0.0100
Office 0.1088 0.0080 0.0064 0.0072 -0.0499 -0.1177 0.0740 -0.0058
Other 0.1173 0.0088 0.0089 0.0235 -0.0238 -0.0643 0.0946 -0.0100
Residential 0.1266 0.0069 0.0056 0.0454 0.0129 -0.0300 0.0752 -0.0076
Retail 0.0942 0.0071 0.0057 -0.0013 -0.0527 -0.1121 0.0606 -0.0053
Total 0.0978 0.0071 0.0059 0.0003 -0.0530 -0.1187 0.0639 -0.0058
Benchmark 0.1178 0.0000 0.0000 0.0377 0.0261 0.0142 0.0000 -0.0068
Probability Sharpe Jensen Alt Alpha MPPM2 MPPM3 MPPM4 Info Ratio Stutzer
Diversified 0.4049 0.0005 0.0106 0.6776 0.4094 0.0347 0.0005 0.4049
Hotel 0.0001 0.6072 1.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6072 0.0001
Industrial 0.4531 0.4531 0.4531 0.4531 0.4531 0.4531 0.4531 1.0000
Office 0.1153 0.0000 0.0000 0.0414 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.1153
Other 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2478 0.0192 0.0015 0.0000 0.7011
Residential 0.8238 0.0000 0.0000 0.8238 0.5034 0.0118 0.0000 0.8238
Retail 0.1755 0.0000 0.0005 0.0410 0.0019 0.0001 0.0001 0.2295
Total 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101
Table 7 The table shows the results of the performance evaluation of the REIT sectors under the chosen set of traditional and manipulation-
proof performance measures with varying degrees of constant relative risk aversion ranging from 2 to 4 (denoted MPPM2, MPPM3, and
MPPM4) when considering the 1-month T-bill as proxy for the risk-free rate and the S&P500 as the proxy for the market. The values shown
are the median evaluation results for each sector. Alt. α relates to the value of the constant in a four-factor model. Benchmark values are the
values against which REITs are evaluated. For example, for the Sharpe ratio, the benchmark is the Sharpe ratio of the market proxy S&P 500.
For the Jensen measure, the corresponding benchmark is zero, as implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Probability is the probability of
observing a particular performance measure under the Null of equality with the benchmark value and is obtained from non-parametric binomial
sign tests (Friedman, 1937; Wilcoxon, 1945).
Analysis of the difference in ranking




















Table 8 The table shows the results from a a fixed effects panel model (standard errors clustered by firm) with the annual difference in ranking
under the Jensen measure and the MPPM with ρ = 2 as the dependent variable (D.Rank annual). Predictors include the number of funds
in a REIT’s sector, weighted by a fund’s share of the total number of observations in the sector (Wobs annual). The cumulative number of
monthly return observations generates Age annual. We include the Number of analyst forecasts annual and the G − Index
as a measure of corporate governance. Rank Jensen annual, Jensen annual and MPPM2 annual capture absolute and relative
performance on an annual basis. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** significant at 0.1%, ** at
1%, * at 5%.
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Appendix
A Performance evaluation results with 10-year government bond
Panel (a) Pre 2002 Panel (b) Post 2002
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1165 0.1436 0.0002 Sharpe 0.0535 -0.0407 0.0000
Jensen 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0082 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0019 0.0000 0.0049
MPPM2 0.0430 0.0531 0.0004 MPPM2 -0.0494 -0.0560 0.6208
MPPM3 0.0239 0.0420 0.0000 MPPM3 -0.1092 -0.0762 0.0029
MPPM4 0.0001 0.0306 0.0000 MPPM4 -0.1901 -0.0970 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0265 0.0000 0.0504 Info-Ratio 0.0973 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0060 -0.0094 0.0313 Stutzer -0.0022 0.0000 0.0000
Panel (c) Pre 2008 Panel (d) Post 2008
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1077 0.0948 0.3190 Sharpe 0.0248 -0.1487 0.0000
Jensen 0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0177 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0022 0.0000 0.0316
MPPM2 0.0293 0.0312 0.8682 MPPM2 -0.2692 -0.1968 0.0206
MPPM3 0.0072 0.0191 0.0673 MPPM3 -0.4400 -0.2338 0.0000
MPPM4 -0.0133 0.0066 0.0015 MPPM4 -0.5913 -0.2714 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0560 0.0000 0.0000 Info-Ratio 0.1316 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0066 -0.0034 0.0459 Stutzer -0.0006 0.0000 0.0000
Panel (e) 2002 to 2008
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1021 0.0164 0.0000
Jensen 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0039 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0329 -0.0087 0.0000
MPPM3 0.0105 -0.0228 0.0004
MPPM4 -0.0166 -0.0372 0.0125
Info-Ratio 0.0942 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0058 0.0000 0.0000
Table 9 The table shows the results of the performance evaluation of all REITs (representing the simple unweighted average of all REITs)
under the chosen set of traditional and manipulation-proof performance measures with varying degrees of constant relative risk aversion ranging
from 2 to 4 (denoted MPPM2, MPPM3, and MPPM4) when considering the 10-year U.S. government bond and the S&P 500 index as proxies
for the risk-free rate and the stock market benchmark. The values shown are the median evaluation results. Alt. α relates to the value of the
constant in a four-factor model. Benchmark values are the values against which REITs are evaluated. Probability is the probability of observing
a particular performance measure under the Null of equality with the benchmark value and is obtained from non-parametric binomial sign tests
(Friedman, 1937; Wilcoxon, 1945).
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B Performance evaluation results with MSCI world index
Panel (a) 1MTB & MSCI, pre-2002 Panel (b) 1MTB & MSCI, post-2002
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1502 0.1147 0.0017 Sharpe 0.0863 0.0605 0.0016
Jensen 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0616 0.0353 0.0008 MPPM2 -0.0192 0.0061 0.0206
MPPM3 0.0428 0.0257 0.1180 MPPM3 -0.0729 -0.0091 0.0000
MPPM4 0.0254 0.0160 1.0000 MPPM4 -0.1576 -0.0250 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0265 0.0000 0.0504 Info-Ratio 0.0973 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0111 -0.0065 0.0002 Stutzer -0.0044 -0.0018 0.0016
Panel (c) 1MTB & MSCI, pre-2008 Panel (d) 1MTB & MSCI, post-2008
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1422 0.1394 0.3190 Sharpe 0.0504 -0.1098 0.0000
Jensen 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 Jensen 0.0163 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0069 0.0000 0.0000 Alt Alpha 0.0026 0.0000 0.0131
MPPM2 0.0574 0.0456 0.0673 MPPM2 -0.1991 -0.1673 0.2481
MPPM3 0.0366 0.0368 0.8682 MPPM3 -0.3512 -0.2034 0.0001
MPPM4 0.0108 0.0278 0.0197 MPPM4 -0.5105 -0.2407 0.0000
Info-Ratio 0.0560 0.0000 0.0000 Info-Ratio 0.1316 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0114 -0.0095 0.3190 Stutzer -0.0015 0.0000 0.0000
Panel (e) 1MTB & MSCI, 2002-2008
Measure REITs Benchmark Probability
Sharpe 0.1527 0.1906 0.0015
Jensen 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000
Alt Alpha 0.0073 0.0000 0.0000
MPPM2 0.0638 0.0644 1.0000
MPPM3 0.0396 0.0571 0.0125
MPPM4 0.0161 0.0496 0.0002
Info-Ratio 0.0942 0.0000 0.0000
Stutzer -0.0129 -0.0177 0.0004
Table 10 The table shows the results of the performance evaluation of all REITs (representing the simple unweighted average of all REITs)
under the chosen set of traditional and manipulation-proof performance measures with varying degrees of constant relative risk aversion ranging
from 2 to 4 (denoted MPPM2, MPPM3, and MPPM4) when considering the 1-month T-bill and the MSCI world index as proxies for the risk-
free rate and the stock market benchmark. The values shown are the median evaluation results. Alt. α relates to the value of the constant in a
four-factor model. Benchmark values are the values against which REITs are evaluated. Probability is the probability of observing a particular
performance measure under the Null of equality with the benchmark value and is obtained from non-parametric binomial sign tests (Friedman,
1937; Wilcoxon, 1945).
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